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Abstract 
Over the last few years, the importance of establishing and maintaining a positive safety culture 
in the process industry and its impact on the safety performances of a company have strongly 
been emphasized by regulatory institutions, academia and very importantly by the process 
industry itself. A strong safety culture, when everyone in a company feels responsible for safety 
and acts accordingly, is not achieved overnight as it requires changing behaviors and instilling 
safety values to individuals. The challenge is there for existing employees of a company but also 
for new recruits. In the particular case of freshly graduated engineers, it is often only when 
joining a company that the individual discovers the concept of safety culture and has to buy into 
it. Academia could play a much better role in training engineers who, not only understand the 
process safety challenges faced by the industry, but genuinely join the industry with a pre-
established positive safety culture developed during the years of their education. 
Instilling a process safety culture to future engineers is an area that still requires major efforts 
from academia. Experimental research at university or college often involves the handling of 
hazardous substances and processes, with an associated level of risk that need to be minimized. 
Incidents (major and minor) do happen in university laboratories. It is very common that only 
major incidents are reported and investigated. Operational deviations, minor incidents, near 
misses almost never see the light of discussion, although they are opportunities to instill a 
process safety culture to students, as they are in the process industry. 
The objective of this paper is to provide a case study on building process safety culture in a 
research environment by applying different key aspects of process safety principles. In this 
study, a series of experiments were analyzed to show how process safety principles starting from 
inherently safer design and management program can be learnt while performing experimental 
research. The authors have found that investigating the root causes of near misses have multiple 
benefits. During the actual experiments no injuries have occurred and even the potential of 
having injuries was relatively low. However, in the context of this study, selected issues were 
investigated as accidents, which referred to not being able to successfully perform the 
experiments or near miss referred to delay of a planned / scheduled experiment. As the matter of 
fact, all these issues may be treated as time and financial losses. Different aspects of failures such 
as human factor, process design or inherently safer design and standard operating procedures 
were discussed via case studies. It was found that having students discussing and presenting the 
investigation results to other students has greatly improved not only the safety aspects of 
research but also the productivity and safety culture of the involved researchers. 
1. Introduction 
Regulatory bodies such as the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE), US Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have 
recognized and encouraged the companies to nurture a strong safety culture for the reduction of 
losses. According to OSHA, developing such a culture “should be top priority for all managers 
and supervisors”. Best practice guides, notes, bulletins are often issued by authorities having 
jurisdiction to improve the quality of safety cultures. The US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) has 
often reiterated the importance of safety culture in their investigation of major incidents such as 
the BP Texas City Refinery [1] and Tesoro Refinery [2]. Researchers have been working on 
beneficial process safety culture over the last decade. Some of the important directions of this 
vast research area are related to the definition of safety culture [3], [4], organizational culture and 
attitude towards safety, diagnosing and measuring safety performances [5]. 
Despite of the well-recognized importance of safety culture in the process industry, there is still 
an urgent need for major improvement in the way academia is instilling and cultivating a strong 
safety culture to undergraduate and graduate students. 
Over the last years numerous serious laboratory incident were reported. The CSB has gathered 
information on 120 different university laboratory incidents over 10 years (2001-2011) after the 
incident of Texas Tech University Chemistry Laboratory [6]. In 2010, the CSB Chairman John 
Bresland, suggested to “examine these accidents to see if they can be prevented through the kind 
of rigorous safety management systems that we [the CSB] and others have advocated in 
industrial settings” [7]. 
Academia can tackle safety management and safety culture issues in research laboratories and 
provide competent engineers to the industry. Experimental research at university or college 
provides opportunities to instill a process safety culture to students. This paper presents a case 
study on building process safety culture in a research environment by applying different key 
aspects of process safety principles. A series of LNG research related experiment have been 
conducted at the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Centre (MKOPSC) extension at Texas 
A&M University at Qatar (TAMU-Qatar). It is to be noted that the results of the research is not 
presented here but the research work is rather analyzed from a safety stand point to depict 
different process safety principles that were involved and how a stronger safety culture can be 
built in the context of the experimental work. The prime objective is to demonstrate the 
importance and benefits of learning from near misses incidents and perhaps more importantly 
from early indicators or weak signals. 
2. Elements of Safety Management Systems 
The application of inherently safer design principles and a good safety management program are 
of paramount importance for safety performances in all steps of a process life cycle. 
In the US, facilities that store and use hazardous chemicals are required to comply to the 
requirements of OSHA’s Process Safety Management (PSM) standard (29 CFR 1910.119) and 
the EPA’s Risk Management Plan standard (40 CFR Part 68). In Europe, a major accident 
prevention that covers all moderate and large size plants is implemented through Seveso III 
directive [8], which is somewhat more general than US approach and built based on Safety Case 
philosophy. In addition, these requirements are supported by standards on occupational health 
and safety management systems, both in US [9] and in Europe [10]. In fact, many elements of 
each approach of managing safety are common in these regulations and standards, and for the 
needs of this exercise the authors focused mainly on OSHA PSM, although they implemented 
somewhat Seveso approach as well to evaluate severity of the consequences of the potential 
incident. 
The OSHA PSM is composed of the following fourteen inter-related elements [11]: (a) employee 
participation; (b) process safety information (PSI); (c) process hazard analysis (PHA); (d) 
operating procedures; (e) training; (f) contractors; (g) pre-start up safety review; (h) mechanical 
integrity; (i) hot works permit; (j) management of change (MOC); (k) emergency planning and 
response; (l) compliance audits; (m) trade secrets; and (n) incident investigation. 
Experiments performed at university do not have the level of complexity or the scale of a process 
plant and are not subject to the above mentioned regulations.  
A group of three students in charge of the preparation and the execution of a series of 
experimental work have tried to apply selected relevant elements of PSM (b, c, d, f, k, l and k) to 
their activities throughout the project. The supervisors of this work, while closely monitoring the 
progress and ensuring that the work was performed in the safest conditions, left a certain degree 
of freedom to the students to encourage the learning process, particularly learning from mistakes. 
 
3. The case study 
The work presented in this paper was done in the context of a major research project aiming to 
improve the prediction of the consequences Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) spill on concrete 
ground. The project particularly focuses on the modelling of LNG vapor generation rate (source 
term). It involves a series of spill experiments designed to measure the vaporization rate of a 
cryogenic liquid pool along with the heat flux to the pool from the concrete ground. The 
experiments are performed at several scales: 
• laboratory scale (7×10-3 m3) at TAMU-Qatar 
• medium scale (up to 32×10-3 m3) at Fire Station 2 of the Ras Laffan Industrial City 
(RLIC) 
• large field scale (up to 40 m3) at the Ras Laffan Emergency and Safety College (RLESC) 
Liquid nitrogen (LN2), liquid oxygen (LO2) and LN2/LO2 binary mixtures (liquid air) are used 
as a safer analogue of LNG. Experiments with LNG will be done only at large scale at RLESC. 
The experimental work included three main phases (Figure 1) somewhat comparable to the 
typical phases of an industrial project: 
• Preparation of the experimental setup (comparable to the Front End Engineering Design, 
FEED and Detailed Engineering Design) 
• Execution of the experiments (comparable to start-up, operations, and regular or 
emergency shut-down) 
• Data Analysis (comparable to incident investigations and process optimization) 
Purchasing/procurement, approval procedures logistics and scheduling were also required during 
the project making it closer the requirement of a real industrial project. Thus, a simple 
experimental project might give sufficient background to learn industrial good practices and the 
general philosophy of project and safety management. 
In this study, only the work for the medium scale experiments at RLIC with LN2, LO2 and 
LN2/LO2 mixture are discussed. 
 
Figure 1: Project Steps 
 
3.1. Preparation: design and building of the experimental setup 
The medium scale experiment setup was built at our laboratory at TAMU-Qatar in Doha. It 
consisted of an instrumented box (liquid capacity of 32×10-3 m3) with a concrete base and steel 
walls (Figure 2) into which cryogenic liquid can be poured to form a liquid pool. Eleven 
thermocouples and two heat flux sensors were embedded into the concrete base at four different 
depths to monitor the temperature and heating flux profiles inside the concrete. The sides of 
concrete box were insulated using polystyrene to limit the heat flux from the walls and favor 
unidirectional vertical heat flux from the concrete base to the pool. 
Once built the box was transported to RLIC where a wind tunnel was specially built to 
accommodate the box while controlling / limiting air flow above the liquid pool and limiting the 
pool exposure to solar radiation. In the tunnel the box was placed on a balance to monitor the 
vaporization rate of the liquid. 
All sensors’ output were connected to a data acquisition system at a remote location. 
 
 
Figure 2: Experimental setup and timeline. From left to right: thermocouples, concrete box 
preparation, installation of heat flux sensors, built concrete box with steel walls, and final setup 
with polystyrene insulation on the sides 
 
LN2, LO2 and LN2/LO2 binary mixtures were discharged from a 180 liters storage cylinder (1.5 
m high and 0.6 m diameter).The maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) of the cylinder 
was 24 barg (348 psig) and the relief pressure control valve was set at 15 psi (about 1 barg). The 
cylinder was delivered and unloaded by a contractor. The cylinder was delivered in a basket to 
ensure its stability. The cryogen was discharged through a 16 meter long, ½ inch diameter; 




3.2. Execution of the experiments 
The discharge was controlled manually by the research staff through the manual valve located on 
the cylinder. A relatively long length hose was chosen to ensure a safer distance of the operator 
from the discharge location. The mass loss of vaporizing liquid was recorded every second and a 
30 s averaged vaporization rate was calculated. Liquid was discharged into the containment as 
long as it reached its upper operational limit (equivalent of 0.29 m3), which last approximately 5 
minutes. The box was covered with a polystyrene lid to limit the effect of convective heat 
transfer to the pool. The liquid vaporization rate calculated based on mass loss measurement was 
directly proportional to the total heat flux to the pool, which includes the conduction through the 
ground (concrete base), walls and lid. The photos of the experiment are shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Liquid nitrogen and liquid oxygen spill over concrete experiment at RLIC 
 
4. Practiced Safety Management Elements during the Case Study 
As mentioned, a group of three students in charge of the preparation and the execution of a series 
of experimental work have tried to apply selected elements of PSM (b, c, d, f, k, l and k) to their 
activities throughout the project. The analysis and discussion on these elements was done during 
and after the experiment was performed. 
 
4.1. Process Safety Information: 
According to OSHA, process safety information are complete and accurate written information 
concerning process chemicals, process technology, and process equipment and are essential for 
the PHA. In our case, process safety information includes but was not limited to  
• Material Safety Data Sheet of LN2, LO2, and LN2/LO2 mixture 
• Experiment Start-up, Operation, and Shut-down Procedure 
• Emergency Action Plan and Response Procedure 
• Design of the experimental setup and User manuals of the equipment (Balance, Data 
Acquisition System) 
• Consequence Analysis Report 
• Permits, consents, licenses and authorization to conduct the experiment at RLIC 
• Site Layout and Occupancy Data 
• Local Weather Data 
• Specifications of Vendor’s Equipment (Cryogenic Liquid Tank) and certification of 
vendor 
 
4.2. Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
The PHA is one of the most important elements of the process safety management program. It is 
an organized and systematic effort to identify and analyze the significance of potential hazards 
associated with the processing or handling of highly hazardous chemicals. It provides the input 
for frequency, consequence and risk analysis. A variety of methods can be used to conduct a 
PHA and the method selected will depend on the complexity, the size and maturity of the process 
and operational experience of the team members. In this study, a general qualitative approach has 
been taken. The details of the PHA methodology conducted in this case study are presented 
below. 
 
Risk Ranking and Management Procedure  
Risk in general is defined as a measure of potential economic loss or human injury in terms of 
the probability of the loss or injury occurring and their magnitude. Risk thus comprises of two 
variables; magnitude of consequences and the probability of occurrence. The results of the 
consequence modelling and the frequency of the scenarios were placed on a risk matrix with 
given risk criteria as shown in Figure 4. The consequence severity of any perceived hazardous 
scenario is identified as 0 to 4 where 0 indicates the minimum and 4 indicates maximum. 
Similarly, a qualitative approach is taken to define the frequency of occurrence of the perceived 
scenario as shown on the top of the risk matrix. A 0 likelihood indicates that it is certain the 
event will not occur on the other hand 4 indicates the certainty of the event happening. Each cell 
of the matrix indicates the risk level. Red cells indicate the intolerable risk level. No operations 
or experiments in this case can be conducted if any perceived scenario falls in this zone. Proper 
risk mitigation actions are needed to reduce the risk level to at-least to the next level which is 
yellow zone. The target of the research group is to operate in the green zone – fully acceptable 
level of risk. The work is allow if the level of risk is yellow under some conditions. First, such a 
case should be reviewed to introduce additional controls, if possible. Second, if proper 
consequence prevention and mitigation measurements are in place, it has to be demonstrated that 
the risk is at as low as reasonable practicable level. Then it is assumed that the risk is tolerable 
and acceptable and the team may proceed with caution, monitoring and maintaining strictly 
preventive and mitigation measurements. 
 
 
 Low risk – Fully acceptable. Monitor 
and manage. 
 Medium risk – Tolerable and 
acceptable risk as long as 
demonstrated that the risk is at as low 
as reasonable practicable level. 
Review and introduce additional 
controls if possible. Monitor and 
maintain strict measures. 
 High risk – Not acceptable. Do not 
proceed! 
Figure 4: Risk matrix 
 
Hazard Identification 
Preliminary Hazards Analysis method was used to identify the hazards associated to the 
experiments. Brainstorming sessions were organized for hazard identification via answering a 
series of questions considering different phase of the experiments including construction, 
installation and execution. Several hazards with the associated safeguards were identified and 
discussed. Some recommendations were also given to reduce some risks to lower level. A typical 
example of hazard identification results (selected identified accident scenarios) and risk 
assessment summary is given in Table 2 (where severity and probabilities are ranked from 1-4) 
and some critical elements are summarized below. 
There is no possibility of fire or vapor cloud explosion as the cryogenic liquids used are not 
flammable. However, as cryogenic liquids are extremely cold, any contact of bare body parts 
with the liquid or cold surface will cause frostbites and cold burns. When released in large 
amount, the inhalation of high concentrations of N2, if the level of drops below 16% in air, can 
cause rapid suffocation and death. Symptoms at lower concentrations (if O2 level drops below 
19.5%) may include loss of consciousness and mobility, dizziness and nausea. O2 is a strong 
oxidizer and can enhance fires or even the potential for fire. Continuous O2 inhalation of 
concentrations higher than 75% may cause nausea, dizziness, respiratory difficulty, cough, sore 
throat and convulsion. 
Cryogens produces large volumes of gas when they vaporize. One volume of LN2 and LO2 will 
respectively expand to produce 696.5 and 861 equivalent volume of gas. Both gases are 
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white fog, which is condensed air moisture. The suffocation was considered as credible scenario, 
if the person is exposed to white cloud (high concentration of cold gas) followed an accidental 
release of LN2. In such a case, an evacuation of personnel (if present) from the shelter was 
recommended, even though it was open from two sides to ensure ventilation. Outside of the 
shelter, there is an open air space and the nitrogen concentration will decrease quickly. 
Suffocation was not considered as a credible scenario during the release of liquid air or oxygen. 
As mentioned, the cylinder was equipped with a pressure relief device to control the internal 
pressure at 15 psi when the MAWP was 358 psi and the cylinder was equipped with an 
additional rupture disc. To protect from extremely cold temperatures, the pipe was insulated and 
the operator wore adequate personal protective equipment (PPE): long sleeve clothes, pants, 
safety shoes, cryogenic apron and gloves, safety glasses and helmet. 
 
Table 1: The example of hazard identification outcome (selected identified an accident 










The overheating may 
lead to the over 
pressurization of the 
cylinder and an excessive 
release rate during the 
spill into the box, which 
is in the wind tunnel 
shelter. In case of liquid 
nitrogen spill, this may 
result in the 
concentration of oxygen 
in the air to drop below a 
safe limit with potential 
for asphyxiation, for 
personnel if were to be 
present in the wind 
tunnel. 
1 4 Medium 
The liquid pipe is insulated and 
sheltered and the cylinder is insulated to 
limit solar radiation. 
The experiment is performed in the 
open air (wind tunnel is open from two 
sides) and the nitrogen concentration 
will decrease quickly with the distance. 
High concentration of nitrogen during 
the experiment is present only very 
close to the box – personnel should not 
put the head close to the box. 
The presence of personnel in the shelter 
should be kept as short as possible. In 
the case of an accidental release (box 
catastrophic failure), evacuate all 
personnel from the shelter. 
All personnel during the experiment is 
located at remote control room 40 m 
away upwind of the spill. 
The cylinder is operated outside of the 
shelter, about 15 m away of the spill. 
Self-contained breathing apparatus 
(SCBA) may be required, if large 
amount of LN2 is released. 
Wait for ventilation of the shelter prior 
to entry.  
Exclusion distance is 2m from the 
shelter upwind. Restricted human 
presence downwind. 
Explosion In case of overheating of 
the cylinder due to 
excessive solar radiation, 
there is a potential for 
cylinder burst and 
physical explosion, with 
potential for serious 
injuries to people or 
fatalities. 
1 4 Medium 
The cylinder is insulated to limit solar 
radiation. 
The cylinder is equipped with pressure 
relief valve (set at 22 psi) and rupture 
disc (set at 30 psi). 
Maximum Allowable Working Pressure 
for the cylinder is 348 psi (24 bar), 
which about 16 time higher than the set 
pressure of the pressure relief valve.  
The cylinder is installed inside a heavy 
duty cage to ensure the stability and 
prevent flying. 
All personnel during the experiment is 
located at remote control room 40 m 
away of the cylinder. 
Emergency responders are located very 
closed to the experimental location and 
informed about experiment hazards and 





Foot injuries may happen 
during the move of heavy 
objects. 
2 1 Low 
Wear safety shoes at all time. 
Limit a movement of heavy objects. 
Burn hazard 
from the low 
temperature 
of cryogen 
Frostbites are possible if 
bare body parts are in 
contact with cryogenic 
liquid or cold surfaces. 
2 1 Low 
Always wear cryogenic gloves and 
apron, long sleeves and long legs 
clothes, safety shoes and goggles when 
handling cryogenic liquid to avoid cold 
burn. 
*P:  Probability; S: Severity of the consequences 
 
Consequence and Frequency Analysis 
In order to identify risk, the first step after generating potential accident scenarios is to identify 
the consequences of those potential accident scenarios. In this study a spectrum of potential 
consequences of accidental spill of cryogenic liquids have been constructed and studied. Each 
accident scenario was studied for two different weather conditions namely the “worst case” and 
the “alternate case”. The worst case condition was considered for slow wind speed 1.5 m s-1 and 
stable atmospheric air stability class F (clouded sky and no solar radiation). The alternate case 
did represent a prevalent weather condition, namely 5 m s-1 wind speed with the atmospheric 
stability class type D (sunny day). Both scenarios assumed an ambient temperature of 35°C and 
70% humidity (typical for Qatar). The considered scenarios included: 
• Scenario 1: Vaporization of the cryogenic liquid pool during normal operation, i.e. 
vaporization from 0.25 m2 pool area with a maximum pool depth of 0.4 m. The chosen 
pressure of the cylinder is 15 psi (~1 barg) representing normal operating pressure. 
• Scenario 2: Full bore rupture from ½ inch hose and spill of cryogenic liquid on the 
ground. The chosen pressure of the cylinder is also 15 psi (~1 barg) representing normal 
operating pressure. 
• Scenario 3: Release due to the catastrophic failure of storage tank (0.180 m3 liquid 
cylinder) at a burst pressure equal to the MAWP of the cylinder (24 barg). 
These scenarios were studied for LN2 and LO2 using PHAST 6.7, a commercial consequence 
modelling software. The releases of LN2/LO2 mixture (liquid air) vapor dispersion were not 
considered hazardous with regards to inhalation as it approximately represents air.  
Two levels of concern (LOC) vapor concentration were analyzed for N2 and O2 as shown in 
Table 1. LOC-1 represents the first negative health effect to people and LOC-2 represents 
potential fatalities (although in case of oxygen it is a rather conservative approach). Both levels 
are correlated to the actual level of O2 in air. It was assumed that O2 concentration below 16% 
and above 75% are fatal (LOC-2). O2 concentration between 19.5 and 23% are considered safe 
with no adverse effects on people. 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the results of the consequence analysis of the scenarios 1 and 3, 
respectively: 
• Scenario 1 with LO2: No LOC-2 zone (fatalities) was identified. LOC-1 (minor health 
effect - blue line in Figure 5 does not extend beyond a distance of 3.3 m downwind. 
There is no operator present downwind of the box thus this scenario does not pose 
credible negative effects to people, if procedures are followed. Therefore, the risk of 
negative consequences of this scenario can be considered as minimal and acceptable. 
Therefore, this scenario is not needed to be further studied.  
• Scenario 3 with LO2: The release of the full oxygen inventory due to catastrophic 
failure of storage tank create life-threatening zone (LOC-2, red line in Figure 6) of 10 m 
diameter located more or less at the center of the release. The LOC-1 zone is about 70 m 
wide and the center of the cloud is about 15 m downwind of the release point (blue line in 
Figure 6). Both consequences present potential for injuries only to the operator during the 
manual valve operation, which is short and last less than 5 min and the hazardous clouds 
do not reach the control room which is located 40 m away upwind of the box. Since, the 
material is oxygen which does not have significant threat when vaporized, the severity of 
this event was considered as 3. However, engineering judgements and previous 
experience dictates that the frequency of this event occurring is 1. Therefore this scenario 
falls in the yellow zone and the experiments can still be preceded with caution. 
 
Table 2: The levels of concern for liquid nitrogen and liquid oxygen releases (correlating actual 
oxygen concentration in air is given in the brackets) 
Level Description LOC of liquid nitrogen, % 
LOC of liquid oxygen, 
% 
LOC-1 first negative health effect to the people 
6.25 
(19.5% of OX in air) 
2.78 
(23% of OX in air) 
LOC-2 fatalities 23.1 (16% of OX in air) 
68.43 
(75% of OX in air) 
 
 
The frequency of each identified scenario was not evaluated through the rigorous techniques 
used in standard quantitative risk assessment but rather on the basis of the number and 
qualitative reliability of the existing barriers e.g. relief devices, ventilation, presence of 
procedure. Besides the existing engineering barriers, several other frequency reduction measures 
were considered when needed. This includes exclusion zones, emergency response plan, and safe 
operating procedures. Credit has been taken for the presence of a qualified emergency response 
team of RLIC throughout the experiment duration.  
 
 
Figure 5: Scenario 1- Maximum concentration footprint of dispersed oxygen gas (exceeding air) 
towards downwind direction 
 
Figure 6: Scenario 3- Maximum concentration footprint of dispersed oxygen gas (exceeding air) 
towards downwind direction 
 
Risk Communication 
The experiments were to be performed at RLIC operated by Qatar Petroleum (QP). The results of 
the risk assessment were presented to Qatar Petroleum (QP) representatives and staff. Although 
QP owns many operational sites/plants, none of them is in the near proximity of the experimental 
site. Nevertheless, the risks associated with conducting these experiments were communicated 
via written report, site visit and brainstorming meetings. The assessed safety distances were 
discussed and approved in those meetings and recommendation was made to restrict the site only 
to authorized persons with proper Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE). 
 
4.3. Emergency Response Plan 
Emergency actions should be planned and drills must be performed regularly to tackle unwanted 
release of hazardous material. Industries are required to develop and implement an emergency 
action plan for the entire plant, not just the processes in accordance with the provisions of 29 
CFR 1910.38(a) and 29 CFR 1910.120(a), (p) and (q). The plan needs to be comprehensive, 
including notification to emergency responders, operational responses and precautions to protect 
other employees and the public. Likewise, we planned emergency actions and the emergency 
response plan was discussed with the fire fighters and emergency responders of the industrial 
city. An emergency response team from RLIC Fire Station-2 was on stand-by during the 
commissioning of the experimental set up and the execution of the experiment. 
 
4.4. Use of Third Party Contractors 
The choice of contractors to perform work on and in the vicinity of processes that involve highly 
hazardous chemicals, needs to be closely controlled through a screening process. In our case, we 
needed a contractor to supply the cryogenic liquid cylinders at the test site. The chosen 
contractor did performed similar work with another research group and was recommended for 
the job. The representative of our research group has visited a contractor site to discuss the job 
and to evaluate the contractor, which resulted in positive results. Couple of days before each 
experiment, the contractor was being informed about the experiment date and quantity of liquid 
needed for delivery. 
 
4.5. Operating Procedures 
Operating Procedures are clear instructions for conducting activities safely. Operating 
procedures describe tasks to be performed, data to be recorded, operating conditions to be 
maintained, samples to be collected, and safety and health precautions to be taken. The 
procedures need to be technically accurate, understandable, up to date, and reliable and they 
reflect current operations. The process safety information and the result of process hazards 
analysis were used as a resource to established and/or improve the operating procedures and 
practices. Written checklists were prepared in order to follow and document each procedure. 
 
4.6. Experimental incidents and their investigation 
Incident can occur because of numerous reasons. However, the culture of learning from incidents 
especially those that are not costly, i.e. near misses, challenges to safety systems or even the 
deviations from the design of the process can significantly reduce the number of incidents. The 
analysis of the root causes of such incidents enhance safety management systems and make them 
more capable of reducing risk and improve safety in many aspects. We focused on the analysis 
of events that we categorized as near-misses. Though sometime near misses are considered as 
lagging indicator of process safety, the root cause analysis of the near miss incident can give us 
very useful leading indicators [12]. Three near misses while carrying out the experiments have 
been identified and analyzed. 
 
Near Miss 1: Ineffective communication leading to the delay of the field experiments 
While preparing and performing the experiments, the research team had to travel a distance of 
about 80 km (1 hour drive approximately), from the University to the experimental facility at 
RLIC every morning of each preparation and experimental day. Every time, the cryogenic liquid 
delivery was scheduled on early morning of the experiment day. The following incidents 
happened: 
• The contractor, cryogenic liquid supplier, forgot to provide the cryogenic hose used to 
connect the cylinder with the spill box. Consequently, the research team was not able to 
perform the experiment. This led to an unexpected delay in the work to be performed. 
Using the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for this incident, the cause leading to the major event can 
be understood as follows: 
 
 
Figure 7: Fault Tree Analysis for Near Miss 1 
 
The basic events for the incident were identified as: a) Incomplete checklist prior to field 
experiment, b) Insufficient supervision in the research team, c) Vendor is lack of the delivery 
checklist, d) Operator is lack of training, e & f) Poor communication between the manager and 
the operator inside the vendor company. 
Researchers experienced also another similar near miss that also happened due to the ineffective 
communication. During normal purchase process, the LN2 supplier required an official letter and 
written communication (email) from the research team before every order. The research team, di 
not only relied on those two, but also made it a habit to call the contractor a day or two before 
every supply to confirm the delivery. As a result, a call from the research team side also became 
a norm to the supplier, while never written. For this particular incident, the student responsible 
for the communication with the contractor did send documents and email as expected, but did not 
Hose was not delivered
Poor communication between 
research group and vendor
Insufficient supervisionIncomplete checklist
Operator forgot to bring 
the hose
A B
Absence of checklist Operator’s lack of knowledge
Operators’ Training





make the phone call a day before experiment assuming that everything was clear in the written 
communication. On the day of the experiment, the contractor did not deliver the LN2 explaining 
that they assumed that the experiment was cancelled as they did not receive the call. The 
experiment had to be postponed by several days. 
In the case of the first incident, we have identified the root cause as lack of verification of the 
vendor and lack of communication with the vendor prior to the experiment, which can ensure the 
requested items would indeed be delivered. Prior to this incident, the hose was always clearly 
requested to the contractor and the contractor had always delivered it accordingly. However, this 
time the cylinder was requested and it was assumed on our side that the hose would be delivered 
as usual. Unfortunately, the contractor’s driver who used to deliver was changed and the new 
driver was not aware of the need to systematically bring the hose.  
Performance of routine tasks day by day in familiar condition may cause this kind of lapse and 
one’s attention can be focused on something else than the task to be performed. The root causes 
of these events are: a) Lack of control on the contractor, b) Lack of followed checklists, and c) 
Lack of communication. The example of the hose also showed that the change of driver 
contributed to the issue. This highlighted the importance of managing changes. Lesson learnt: the 
dependence on human memory should be supported by structured methods, like checklists, to 
reduce human error. 
 
Near Miss 2: Over pressurized air released through pressure relief valve  
During the second day of the experiment, liquid air vapor was released unintentionally through 
the relief valve. After each release of the liquid from the cryogenic tank, the pressure in the 
cylinder drops down, which is normal and each time before the following spill experiment the 
pressure has to be built-up by opening another valve until the pressure increases back to its 
desired level (in this case 15 psi). The pressure building process being time consuming, the 
operator does not wait next to the cylinder under very strong sun, and usually goes inside the 
control room protecting him from solar radiation. He only goes periodically to check on the 
pressure. 
During this particular day, the same procedure was followed and after the first spill experiment 
the operator opened the pressure build-up valve and went to control room. However, before he 
went back to cylinder to check the value, the pressure had already increased to the pressure relief 
valve set pressure (at 22 psi). This resulted in a noisy whistling high pressure release from the 
relief valve, which alarmed the operator, who went to close the valve. Normal operation was 
resumed shortly after. 
Usually, the pressure build up process, the cryogenic gas release and the cryogenic liquid release 
are executed by opening different valve on the top of the liquid cylinder (see Figure 8). 
Typically, the cryogenic liquid cylinder usage involves three stages:  
1) Pressure Building Circuit - The Pressure builder is used when the demand for gas or 
liquid is greater than the cylinder natural productive capacity. This circuit builds gas 
pressure by removing liquid from the bottom of the tank, and passing it through a coil 
that is soldered to the outer skin of the tank. The exposure to heat from contact to the tank 
exterior causes the liquid to convert to a gaseous state as it moves back to the top of the 
tank. A pressure building regulator controls the gas flow in this circuit. 
2) Gas Use Circuit - Similar to the pressure building circuit, liquid is taken from the bottom 
of the inner vessel and run through multiple coils that are soldered to the outer vessel, to 
produce gas. This gas is available for low or high pressure applications. 
3) Liquid Withdrawal Circuit - This circuit takes liquid from the bottom of the tank and 
delivers it directly to the liquid valve. 
 
 
Figure 8: Schematic diagram for basic operation of Liquid cylinder. (Left: Pressure Building 
Circuit; Center: Gas Use Circuit; Right: Liquid Withdrawal Circuit.) 
 
The Fault Tree Analysis, the identified basic events for near miss 2 are in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9: Fault Tree Analysis for Near Miss 2 
In this case, the passive safety barrier, which was the pressure relief valve installed on the top of 
cylinder, was challenged and triggered to prevent further worsen of the overpressure scenario. 
The root cause analysis of the event has revealed that the valve had been left open for too long 
without control, which led to a challenge to the safety system. The basic event also indicated that 
for operation under such extreme environmental condition (high temperature, heat, strong solar, 
etc.), appropriate handover shift should be developed. The potential control measures that could 
avoid this event would be to: (a) continuously monitor the pressure development of the cylinder 
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remotely at the control room or (b) put in place a buddy/back to back system to have two 
operators and shifts. 
 
Near Miss 3: Lack of checklist during routine operation 
One research team member forgot to bring the laptop, which is used as the data acquisition 
system terminal, before the departure to the test site. Without the laptop, the experiment could 
not be performed on time. The research team had to drive back to the university to bring the 
laptop, which in turn, lead to an unexpected delay in the work.  
The near miss can be understood as shown in Figure 10: 
 
 
Figure 10: Fault Tree Analysis for Near Miss 3 
 
In this case the checklist included laptop but was not followed. The root cause analysis process 
has revealed the weakness of research team’s checking and verification process, and indicating 
poor safety culture. The basic event A and event D have indicated that communication and 
verification within the research team needs further enhancement, while event B and event C have 
shown the gap between the existing checklist setup and effective safe operation for routine 
operation in the field. 
 
5. Learning and conclusions 
This exercise has exposed students to many aspects of process safety principles.  First, the 
substitution principle of Inherently Safer Design was practiced by selecting a less hazardous 
material, which were LN2 and LO2 as safer analogues of LNG.  Second, some elements of safety 
management were learnt and practiced throughout the exercise.  Process safety information to 
perform process hazard analysis were prepared and compiled. Hazard identification including the 
development of possible and credible leak/spill events, consequence analysis of potential 
hazardous events, estimation of the frequency of the incidents and risk analysis against 
acceptability criteria were learnt by doing and practiced during the project. Based on the risk 
analysis, safer experimental operational procedures were developed. The risks of performing the 
experiments were communicated in both written reports and in meetings with the appropriate 
authority. The experience of dealing with external contractors was gained and it was learnt that 
this is very important part of process safety and quality management. The development of 
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emergency response planning was performed and the discussion with the real professional 
response team was a very good experience to learn from. Incidents investigation was performed 
after the experiments, lessons have been learnt and improvements were proposed.  
Thus, if not all, many process safety key issues were identified during this experimental work, 
which help to improve a process safety culture in research laboratories and improve 
understanding of the key principles of process safety and their application throughout the life 
cycle of the experimental study. 
Risk communication is another important aspect of good safety culture. After performing the 
experiments, the student involved in the work presented the results of the incident investigation 
to the research group mainly composed of other graduate and undergraduate students to share the 
experience gained.  
Safety culture at the University could be improved significantly if future experimental work was 
performed with application of safety management principles similarly to in the study presented 
in this paper. In fact, performing an experiment at the University is very similar to building a 
project in the industry, but at a much smaller scale. The safety culture of an organization or 
group can be evaluated based on their knowledge of the process safety and how aggressively 
they apply this knowledge on day to day basis. Finally, it is to be noted that none of the incidents 
discussed above had the potential to cause devastating damage to the life or property. However 
the analysis of the failures or near misses has been found extremely useful for future safe 
operations of the system. 
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